Sheringham Woodfields School

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Policy for the Prevention of Extremism and Radicalisation		
Approved by SMT: 24th November 2020	Approved by Staff: 1st December 2020	Approved by Governors: 2nd December 2020
Next Review date: Autumn 2022	Person(s) responsible for review: SLT	

Policy for the Prevention of Extremism and Radicalisation

Policy Consultation & Review

This policy is available on our school website and in hardcopy from the school office on request.

The policy is provided to all staff and should be read in conjunction with the following policies:

- Safeguarding & Child Protection Policy
- Equality Policy
- Behaviour Policy
- E-Safety Policy
- Staff Code of Conduct
- Whistle-blowing Policy

This policy will be reviewed in full by the Governing Body on an annual basis as part of the review of the Safeguarding & Child Protection Policy. This policy was last reviewed and agreed by the Governing Body on 19th September 2018. It is due for review in Autumn Term 2020

Signature Headteacher Date:

Signature Chair of Governors Date:

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1. PURPOSE & AIMS

1.1 Sheringham Woodfields School is fully committed to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of all its pupils. We recognise that safeguarding against radicalisation and extremism is no different to safeguarding against any other vulnerability in today's society.

1.2 Our school fully recognises the contribution it can make to promoting the welfare of children and protecting them from harm. This policy sets out our strategies and procedures to protect vulnerable pupils from being radicalised or exposed to extremist views. The elements of our policy are prevention, protection and support.

1.3 At Sheringham Woodfields School, we will ensure that:

- All staff, volunteers and governors, have an understanding of what radicalisation and extremism is and why we need to be vigilant in school.
- Through training, staff, volunteers and governors will know what the school policy is on tackling extremism and radicalisation and how to respond when concerns arise.
- Through our curriculum, we will promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils.
- Parents/carers and pupils will know that the school has policies in place to keep pupils safe from harm and that the school regularly reviews these systems to ensure they are appropriate and effective.

1.4 This policy applies to all pupils, staff, parents, governors, volunteers and visitors.

1.5 A glossary of related terms and indicators of vulnerability to extremism can be found in Appendices 1 & 2 of this policy.

2. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 It is the responsibility of *every* member of staff, volunteer and regular visitor to our school to ensure that they carry out the requirements of this policy and, at all times, work in a way that will safeguard and promote the welfare of all of the pupils at this school.

2.2 The Governing Body of Sheringham Woodfields School is accountable for ensuring the effectiveness of this policy and our compliance with it. The Governing Body will ensure that:

- This policy is reviewed annually alongside our Safeguarding & Child Protection Policy.
- All staff undertake appropriate training that equips them with the skills to identify and respond appropriately to concerns regarding extremism and radicalisation.
- The Headteacher and Designated Safeguarding Lead will assess the risk of pupils being drawn into extremist views. The risk assessment may include

consideration of the school's curriculum, the use of school premises by external agencies and any other local issues relating to the school community.
- A broad curriculum is in place to deliver the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils.
- Appropriate safeguarding arrangements are in place by working in partnership with other agencies and communities as required.
- There are systems in place for keeping pupils safe from extremist material when accessing the internet in our school by using effective filtering and usage policies.

2.3 The Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) will carry out their role in accordance with the responsibilities outlined in Annex B of *'Keeping Children Safe in Education'.* As part of this responsibility, the DSL will act as the point of contact within our school for any concerns relating to radicalisation and extremism.

2.4 The lead DSL at Sheringham Woodfields School will make referrals in accordance with Norfolk Channel procedures to the MASH Team where appropriate and will represent our school at Channel meetings as required.

2.5 The lead DSL is responsible for ensuring that all staff members and volunteers are aware of our policy and the procedures they need to follow. They will ensure that all staff have received appropriate training.

3. TRAINING

3.1 Through training, we will ensure that all of our staff are made fully aware of the threats, risks and vulnerabilities that are linked to radicalisation. Staff will be able to identify children at risk of being drawn into extremism and develop the confidence to challenge extremist ideas. All staff will understand how we can provide support to ensure that our pupils are resilient and supported to resist involvement in radical or extreme activities.

3.2 Our governing body will also undertake appropriate training to ensure they are able to carry out their duty to safeguard all of the children at our school.

4. THE ROLE OF THE CURRICULUM

4.1 At Sheringham Woodfields School we will provide pupils with a broad and balanced curriculum and promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural (SMSC) development of our pupils. Pupils will be encouraged to regard people of all faiths, races and cultures with respect and tolerance.

4.2 Through our curriculum we will aim to:

• enable students to develop their self-knowledge, self-esteem and self-confidence;

• enable students to distinguish right from wrong and to respect the civil and criminal law of England;

• encourage students to accept responsibility for their behaviour, show initiative, and to understand how they can contribute positively to the lives of those living and working in the locality of the school and to society more widely;

• enable students to acquire a broad general knowledge of and respect for public institutions and services in England;

• further tolerance and harmony between different cultural traditions by enabling students to acquire an appreciation of and respect for their own and other cultures;

• encourage respect for other people; and
• encourage respect for democracy and support for participation in the democratic processes, including respect for the basis on which the law is made and applied in England.

5. VISITORS AND THE USE OF SCHOOL PREMISES

5.1 At Sheringham Woodfields School we recognise the role that external agencies and speakers can play in enhancing the learning experiences of our pupils. Where we use external agencies and individuals in this way, we will positively vet them to ensure that their messages are consistent with, and not in opposition to, the school's values and ethos.

5.2 Our school will assess the suitability and effectiveness of input from external agencies or individuals to ensure that:
• Any messages communicated to pupils are consistent with the ethos of the school and do not marginalise any communities, groups or individuals;
• Any messages do not seek to glorify criminal activity or violent extremism or seek to radicalise pupils through extreme or narrow views of faith, religion or culture or other ideologies;
• Activities are properly embedded in the curriculum and clearly mapped to schemes of work to avoid contradictory messages or duplication;
• Activities are matched to the needs of pupils;
• Activities are carefully evaluated by schools to ensure that they are effective.

5.3 Any guest speakers or external agencies will be provided with a copy of our safeguarding procedures on arrival at the school and will be appropriately supervised at all times.

5.4 When an agreement is made to allow non-school groups or organisations to use the school premises, appropriate checks will be made before agreeing the contract. Usage will be monitored and in the event of any behaviour not in-keeping with the Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Policy, the school will contact the police and terminate the arrangement.

6. PROCEDURES FOR MANAGING CONCERNS

6.1 Sheringham Woodfields School adheres to the procedures that have been agreed locally through the Norfolk Children's Safeguarding Board for safeguarding individuals vulnerable to extremism and radicalisation. Please also refer to our Safeguarding & Child Protection Policy for further information about our wider safeguarding responsibilities.

6.2 We recognise that staff at our school play a particularly important role as they are in a position to identify concerns early and provide help for children to prevent concerns from escalating. **All staff are advised to maintain an attitude of '*it could happen here*' where safeguarding is concerned and this includes vulnerability to radicalisation.**

6.3 At all times we will work in partnership and endeavour to establish effective working relationships with parents, carers and colleagues from other agencies in line with Working Together to Safeguard Children (2018).

6.4 The lead Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) should be used as a first point of contact any safeguarding concerns in our school. Any member of staff or visitor to the school who receives a disclosure of or suspects that a child is at risk of radicalisation must report it immediately to the DSL or, if unavailable, to the alternate designated person. In the absence of either of the above, the matter should be brought to the attention of the most senior member of staff.

6.5 Following receipt of any information raising concern about vulnerability to radicalisation, the DSL will consider what action to take and will follow the Norfolk Channel procedures by making a referral via the MASH as required. All information and actions taken, including the reasons for any decisions made, will be fully documented.

6.6 All Channel referrals will be made using the referral form that can be found at Appendix 3.

6.7 If an allegation is made or information is received about an adult who works in our setting which indicates that they may be unsuitable to work with children because of concerns relating to extremism and radicalisation, the member of staff receiving the information should inform the Headteacher or Chair of Governors immediately in line with the procedures outlined in our Safeguarding Policy and the Whistleblowing Policy.

7. RELEVANT POLICIES

7.1 To underpin the values and ethos of our school and our intent to ensure that pupils at our school are appropriately safeguarded, the following policies should be read in conjunction with this policy:

- Safeguarding incorporating Child Protection Policy
- Behaviour
- Equality
- E-safety
- Health and Safety including site security
- Use of School Premises/Lettings
- Whistle-blowing
- Respect, Dignity and Confidentiality
- Teaching and Learning

8. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

8.1 This policy has been devised in accordance with the following legislation and local and national guidance:

- Norfolk Channel Procedures
- The Counter-Terrorism & Security Act 2015
- 'Prevent Duty Guidance: for England & Wales', HM Government (2019)
- 'Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools: Departmental advice for maintained schools', DfE (2014)
- Keeping Children Safe in Education Part 1 2020 DfE (2020)
- 'Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inyer-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children' DfE (2018)
- 'Information Sharing: Advice for practitioners' DfE (2018)

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms[1]

'Extremism' is defined in the 2011 Prevent Strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

'Non-violent extremism' is extremism, as defined above, which is not accompanied by violence.

'Prevention' in the context of the Prevent duty means reducing or eliminating the risk of individuals becoming involved in terrorism. Prevent includes but is not confined to the identification and referral of those at risk of being drawn into terrorism into appropriate interventions. These interventions aim to divert vulnerable people from radicalisation.

'Radicalisation' refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.

The current UK definition of **'terrorism'** is given in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT 2000). In summary this defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

'Terrorist-related offences' are those (such as murder) which are not offences in terrorist legislation, but which are judged to be committed in relation to terrorism.

'Vulnerability' describes the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within Prevent, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation.

[1] Taken from Prevent Duty Guidance: England & Wales, HM Government 2015

Appendix 2: Warning Signs/Indicators of Concern

There is no such thing as a "typical extremist": those who become involved in extremist actions come from a range of backgrounds and experiences, and most individuals, even those who hold radical views, do not become involved in violent extremist activity.

Pupils may become susceptible to radicalisation through a range of social, personal and environmental factors. It is vital that school staff are able to recognise those vulnerabilities. However, this list is not exhaustive, nor does it mean that all young people experiencing the above are at risk of radicalisation for the purposes of violent extremism.

Factors which may make pupils more vulnerable may include:

- **Identity Crisis:** the pupil is distanced from their cultural/religious heritage and experiences discomfort about their place in society.
- **Personal Crisis:** the pupil may be experiencing family tensions; a sense of isolation; low self-esteem; they may have dissociated from their existing friendship group and become involved with a new and different group of friends; they may be searching for answers to questions about identity, faith and belonging.
- **Personal Circumstances:** migration; local community tensions and events affecting the pupil's country or region of origin may contribute to a sense of grievance that is triggered by personal experience of racism or discrimination or aspects of Government policy.
- **Unmet Aspirations**: the pupil may have perceptions of injustice; a feeling of failure; rejection of civic life.
- **Experiences of Criminality**: involvement with criminal groups, imprisonment, poor resettlement or reintegration.
- **Special Educational Need**: pupils may experience difficulties with social interaction, empathy with others, understanding the consequences of their actions and awareness of the motivations of others.

Pupils who are vulnerable to radicalisation may also be experiencing:

• Substance and alcohol misuse
• Peer pressure
• Influence from older people or via the Internet
• Bullying
• Domestic violence
• Race/hate crime

Behaviours which may indicate a child is at risk of being radicalised or exposed to extremist views could include:

- Being in contact with extremist recruiters and/or spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists;
- Loss of interest in other friends and activities not associated with the extremist ideology, group or cause;
- Pupils accessing extremist material online, including through social networking sites;

- Possessing or accessing materials or symbols associated with an extremist cause;
- Using extremist narratives and a global ideology to explain personal disadvantage;
- Pupils voicing opinions drawn from extremist ideologies and narratives, this may include justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues;
- Graffiti symbols, writing or art work promoting extremist messages or images;
- Significant changes to appearance and/or behaviour increasingly centred on an extremist ideology, group or cause;
- Changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group;
- Attempts to recruit others to the group/cause;
- Using insulting or derogatory names for another group;
- Increase in prejudice-related incidents committed by that person – these may include:
  - physical or verbal assault
  - provocative behaviour
  - damage to property
  - derogatory name calling
  - possession of prejudice-related materials
  - prejudice related ridicule or name calling
  - inappropriate forms of address
  - refusal to co-operate
  - attempts to recruit to prejudice-related organisations
  - condoning or supporting violence towards others.
- Parental reports of changes in behaviour, friendship or actions and requests for assistance;
- Partner schools, local authority services, and police reports of issues affecting pupils in other schools.
- Intolerance of difference based upon, but not exclusive to, gender, disability, homophobia, race, identity or culture.

Appendix 3:

CHANNEL
NORFOLK

GUIDANCE ON SAFEGUARDING INDIVIDUALS VULNERABLE TO RADICALISATION (VTR) AND REFERRAL PROCESS

NORFOLK CONSTABULARY

Our Priority is You

Norfolk Safeguarding Adults Board

Norfolk Safeguarding Children Board

1. Introduction

The purpose of the Prevent Strategy is to safeguard vulnerable people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism in all its forms. The strategy has three objectives, one of which is to prevent people from being drawn into extremism and ensure they are given appropriate advice and support.

This document is intended to provide guidance to colleagues who have concerns expressed to them or have the concerns themselves in relation to any person, child or adult, who may be at risk of being adversely influenced or radicalised by any extremist group or ideology.

This guidance relates to persons who are at the early stages of becoming vulnerable to radicalisation or at risk of being influenced by extremism (hereafter referred to as 'VTR').

2. Key Elements

Channel panel and the referral process aim to:

- Identify individuals at risk of being drawn into violent extremism
- Access the nature and extent of that risk
- Develop the most appropriate support for the individuals concerned

This guidance addresses the key elements of the VTR referral process.

a) Information sharing
b) Referral form
c) Channel Practitioner
d) Channel Panel

a) Information sharing

Prevent is safeguarding and therefore existing safeguarding information sharing protocols should be followed. In choosing to share information, a key question for partners to help them provide a proportionate response is, does that partner hold any information that could make the individual more vulnerable to radicalisation?

It is the responsibility of each agency to consider whether in each particular case the sharing of personal information is consistent with their powers and function as a public sector body.

For all bodies sharing personal information (private, voluntary or public sector) it is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Data Protection Act, the Human Rights Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality.

Consent
With regards to consent, the general principle is that information will be shared with the consent of the subject of the information. In some circumstances, however, it will

not be appropriate to seek consent before sharing information with others and/or information can be shared where consent has been refused. These circumstances include when seeking consent could:

- Place the child or others at increased risk of suffering or likely to suffer significant harm; or
- Place an adult at risk of serious harm; or
- Undermine the prevention, detection or prosecution of a serious crime (i.e. any crime which causes or is likely to cause Significant Harm to a child or serious harm to an adult) including where seeking consent might lead to interference with any potential investigation.

Information should only be shared where it is necessary to achieve the intended outcome and is relevant and proportionate to it. Information should be selected for sharing on the basis that the agencies involved need to know that information in order to make informed assessment and decisions. Key to determining this will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public.

Agencies must be in a position to evidence that their decision to share information as part of a VTR Referral is not discriminatory.

A VTR referral form to be used by all agencies, (see Appendix A) is available at www.norfolk.gov.uk/preventingradicalisation .

3. Identification

This section provides examples of indicators that might suggest vulnerability to violent extremism and which may therefore be useful in the VTR process. It should not be assumed that the characteristics and experiences set out necessarily indicate that a person is either committed to violent extremism or may become so, or that these indicators are the only basis on which to make an appropriate decision at this stage.

Expressed opinions – this could include support for violence and terrorism or the values of extremist organisations, airing of political or religious based grievances, unaccepting of other nationalities, religions or cultures.

Material – the following may be relevant:

- Possession of extremist literature and imagery in hard copy or digital form
- Attempts to access, become a member of or contribute to extremist websites and associated password protected chat rooms.
- Possession of material regarding weapons and or explosives
- Possession of literature regarding military training, skills and techniques.

Behaviour and behavioural changes – relevant may include, withdrawal from family, peers, social events and venues; hostility towards former associates and

family, association with prescribed organisations; and association with organisations which hold extremist views that stop short of advocating violence in this country.

Personal History – the following maybe relevant:

- Claims or evidence of involvement in organisations voicing violent extremist ideology in this country or overseas
- Claims or evidence of attendance at military/terrorist training in the UK or overseas
- Claims or evidence of involvement in combat/violent activity, particularly on behalf of violent extremist non state organisations.

5. Referral Process – see Flow Chart Appendix B

Channel Alert/Referral

A completed VTR referral form should be sent by email to the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) by the referrer with the full details needed for the preliminary assessment, (see Appendix A).

The MASH will then initial checks to ensure no crossover with ongoing work and to carry out an initial screening (de-confliction) through the Eastern Region Special Operations Unit.

A referral should not continue through the VTR process if:

- it is malicious or misguided
- the person's engagement with the process would compromise or interfere with ongoing investigations into illegal activity
- it is clear the person is not vulnerable to violent extremism

Once de-confliction checks have been completed, the VTR referral form will then be emailed back to the MASH and multi-agency checks will then be completed by the MASH and sent to the Channel Practitioner

The Channel Practitioner

The Channel Practitioner will conduct a review of the information received and assess whether the referral meets the necessary threshold.

In applying the threshold test the individual circumstances associated with the referral must be taken into account. As a minimum there must be:

- Information evidencing a concern that the individual is either moving towards support for terrorism.
- Or an attraction to terrorism
- Or a vulnerability to radicalisation

If this link is not present, the case should not be managed under Channel and should immediately exit the process. Other safeguarding measures should be considered.

If the criteria is met, the Channel Practitioner records full details of the referral on the Case Management Information System (CMIS), documenting all decisions and actions

In some cases it may not be appropriate for an individual to continue through Channel due to involvement in other statutory support mechanisms (MAPPA and Safeguarding). Where it is apparent that the person referred has vulnerabilities not linked to radicalisation and has needs that require support through other mechanisms they should be referred to the appropriate service providers.

This initial information gathering ensures that only cases appropriate for the Channel process continue to the next stage for a strategy meeting with the Chair of the Channel Panel.

Risk Assessment / Vulnerability Indicators and Preliminary Assessment Decision

Risk assessment is a continuous process from the point of referral to the point an individual exits the process.

The assessment of risk is a key function of the Channel Practitioner, the Preliminary assessment group and the multi-agency Panel.

The preliminary assessment will collectively assess risk, in doing so consideration should be given to the risk the individual faces of being drawn towards or attracted towards terrorism and the risk the individual poses to society.

If during the Preliminary assessment it becomes apparent the referral is not in any way connected or applicable to the process the case can exit.

If the referral is deemed suitable, the case will progress to the multi-agency panel.

Safeguarding Children and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements

The Channel process is not for people in custody. Individuals who are identified as vulnerable within prisons will be managed by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) in partnership with the police. Where people are being released into the community and they are not subject to statutory supervision by probation trusts (those serving sentences under 12 months) NOMS, working with the Channel practitioner, will consider whether the individual should be referred to the Channel process.
If the referred individual is under the age of 18, or where the local authority has a legal duty of care, the Channel practitioner must coordinate with the local authority child assessment framework or social care office in Children and Young People's Services. For referrals of children and young people statutory arrangements for safeguarding children must take precedence.

If a referral under the age of 18 is being managed through a multi-agency meeting, for example under a statutory arrangement for safeguarding children, then this case should still be adopted under the Channel process in the usual way with the Channel practitioner fully embedded and supporting the safeguarding process.

6. Channel Strategy Meeting

Following confirmation that the case is appropriate to continue through the VTR process, the referral should proceed to a strategy meeting and include the involvement of a wider range of partners.

This will be convened on a necessity basis only and will be chaired by a Local Authority lead supported by the Channel Practitioner.

The partners will develop a support package based on the risk assessment, the needs of the individual and any risks posed to potential support providers. Partners may consider sharing information with each other, taking into account the points made in section three.

In assessing referrals the meeting may conclude that the individual is better suited to alternative support providers, or that further assessment indicates that the individual is not being drawn into violent extremism.

If the consensus is that support is required they should devise an appropriate support package. This should take the form of an action plan setting out details of the statutory or third sector partners who will lead on the delivery of the support.

One option for support through the Channel process which the multi-agency panel may decide upon is the use of an ‘Intervention provider’. This is Home Office funded and uses providers on an approved list to work with individuals around their individual ideologies.

Appraisal and Review

To ensure an effective review process to decide whether the individual should remain on the programme the Channel Practitioner is responsible for regularly liaising with the support provider and together with the Multi-Agency Panel assess the progress of the intervention.

Each intervention will be different and there should be regular contact between the intervention provider and the coordinator. However, best practice dictates that a maximum time of 3 months is allowed to elapse between the panels reassessment of the individual's vulnerability. Intervention providers should be submitting regular written updates on progress.

If the Panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case exits the process. A closing report will be submitted setting out the evidence for the Panel’s recommendation. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the senior partners involved in the

preliminary assessments.

Minute-Taking

A confidentiality statement will be read out by the Chair at the start of the meeting and will appear in the minutes.

It will be the responsibility of the Chair to provide a minute-taker. The minutes will include a list of all the agreed actions plus any amendments to the basic information that might have become clear as a result of the meeting.

Action Points will be circulated within one working day of the panel meeting and minutes as soon as practicable.

7. Confidentiality and Security

Information shared at any stage of the referral process is confidential and is to be used only for the purpose of the VTR process and any subsequent actions allocated to the receiving agency or group. It will the responsibility of the disclosing agency/group to highlight any information which is particularly sensitive and to advise on the recording and storage arrangements for that information. Each agency/group is responsible for the secure recording and storage of any shared information and minutes of meetings, and for the secure deletion or return of the shared information once the agency/group is no longer involved in the VTR process in respect of that individual.

APPENDIX A

Person Vulnerable to Radicalisation (VTR) Referral Form

Apr 2016

NORFOLK CONSTABULARY
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RESTRICTED WHEN COMPLETE

Section 1: Person referring to complete **(please expand boxes as required)**	
Subject's full Name (include all known inc alias/maiden if relevant)	
Date and place of birth	
Full Address	
Spouse/Partner/Parents' names/D.O.B	
Children/Siblings names/D.O.B	
Reason for Referral	
Background and risk issues - Page 4 offers guidance notes (include chronology if known)	
Faith / Ideology	
Personal / emotional & Social	
Risk / Protective factors	
Referrers full name, role, contact details & date submitted.	Date:

Once completed, email to Norfolk Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub:
mash.mast@norfolk.pnn.police.uk

Section 2: MASH forward to

Special Branch by e-mail SpecialBranchFIMU@norfolk.pnn.police.uk
Deconfliction checks completed by SB, form then returned to MASH

MASH complete agency checks

This process must only take place after SB deconfliction checks – then return to Special Branch

MASH system checks (please expand boxes as required)	
Police inc. CIS, PNC, PND ☐	
Adult Services ☐	
Children's Services ☐	
Education ☐	
General Health ☐	
Mental Health ☐	
Other (please state)	
Completed by:	Date/time:

Send to Special Branch by e-mail: SpecialBranchFIMU@norfolk.pnn.police.uk

Section 3: Norfolk Special Branch to complete	
SPOE to enter on to FIMU sheet then email to Prevent lead/deputy	SPOE: Sent to: Date: Time:
Deconfliction checks by Prevent lead/deputy **(local/Nat NSBIS, DTU, CMIS)**	Conflict ☐ If yes, stop, back to SPOE; No conflict ☐ If no, proceed to next point; Prevent assessment by:.....
Suitable for CHANNEL support:	YES ☐ If yes, individual needs entering on CMIS at this point. NO ☐
Reasons	
If No, is there an apparent vulnerability to radicalisation to manage outside of CHANNEL through Prevent Case Management?	YES ☐ NO ☐
If No, is there another safeguarding issue apparent but no signs of a vulnerability to radicalisation?	YES ☐ **Raise this with a MASH supervisor, agree outcome and refer back to MASH by email as necessary.** NO ☐ Decision to close referral made by: Date/Time Detail where rationale is recorded:
Referrer notified of outcome	By: Date/Time:

Guidance notes for completing this referral form

This form is to help you refer concerns about an individual who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Below are questions which may help you to quantify and structure your concerns. The list is not exhaustive and other factors may be present but they are intended as a guide to help communicate your professional judgement about what has led you to make this referral.

Faith / ideology

Are they new to a particular faith / faith strand?

Do they seem to have naïve or narrow religious or political views?

Have there been sudden changes in their observance, behaviour, interaction or attendance at their place of worship / organised meeting?

Have there been specific examples or is there an undertone of " Them and Us " language or violent rhetoric being used or behaviour occurring?

Is there evidence of increasing association with a closed tight knit group of individuals / known recruiters / extremists / restricted events?

Are there particular grievances either personal or global that appear to be unresolved / festering?

Has there been an increase in unusual travel abroad without satisfactory explanation?

Personal / emotional / social issues

Is there conflict with their families regarding religious beliefs / lifestyle choices?

Is there evidence of cultural anxiety and / or isolation linked to insularity / lack of integration?

Is there evidence of increasing isolation from family, friends or groups towards a smaller group of individuals or a known location?

Is there history in petty criminality and / or unusual hedonistic behaviour (alcohol/drug use, casual sexual relationships, and addictive behaviours)?

Have they got / had extremist propaganda materials (DVD's, CD's, leaflets etc.) in their possession?

Do they associate with negative / criminal peers or known groups of concern?

Are there concerns regarding their emotional stability and or mental health?

Is there evidence of participation in survivalist / combat simulation activities, e.g. paint balling?

Risk / Protective Factors

What are the specific factors which are contributing towards making the individual more vulnerable to radicalisation (e.g; mental health, language barriers, cultural anxiety, impressionability, criminality, specific grievance, transitional period in life etc.)?

Is there any evidence of others targeting or exploiting these vulnerabilities or risks?

What factors are already in place or could be developed to firm up support for the individual or help them increase their resilience to negative influences? E.g. positive family ties, employment, mentor / agency input etc.

APPENDIX B

- Determine referral is not malicious, misinformed, or involves illegality

VTR referral sent to MASH

olves illegality

- Maintain proper

Referral sent to Prevent inbox
Deconfliction checks completed
CP determines referral is not malicious, misinformed, or involves illegality
CP returns VTR to MASH

MASH complete full agency checks and send updated VTR to CP - decision with Head of Safeguarding/Channel Chair to determine if:

Not appropriate

EXIT
Or refer to alternative support Mechanism via the MASH

Appropriate

Channel Panel held. Determine suitability for Channel process.

Not appropriate

Appropriate

Seek endorsement

- Channel Panel Case
- Collective assessment of support needs based on risk and suitability
- Develop action plan
- Identify and procure appropriate support package
- Review progress

Review

Delivery of support

Key:

SPOE - Single Point of Entry
Deconfliction - system checks to avoid conflict with ongoing work
MASH – Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub
SB – Special Branch
CP – Channel Practitioner